首先，我们必须了解此次金融危机具体的影响程度。尽管这次危机是自20世纪30年代以来的最严重的经济危机，但它只能算是一次小型危机，特别是从其对产量 和就业方面的影响来看。在1931年至1941年10年时间内，美国的失业率高达25%，GDP陡然降低。而其他一些国家和地区也经受着同样程度的巨大危 机。就目前而言，此次金融危机以来，美国的GDP并没有出现明显的下降，失业率也仅仅是6%多一点。这两项指标虽然有继续恶化的趋势，但无论是从深度和广 度来看都无法与上世纪30年代的大萧条相比。
财政部宣布对所有货币市场基金设置保险金额，并对存款进行全额保险，这有可能引发极大的道德风险。
然而此举措的出台 并没有引起市场上各界人士的争议。新出台的银行法案的主要目的就是让国会通过救市计划，让财政部长能利用这笔高达7000亿美元的救市资金去购买银行资产 以增强银行系统的流动性。然而这其中的许多资产由于没有相应的市场，其价值具有很大的不确定性，因此也就不具备市场价格。政府希望能够部分地通过拍卖的方 式而为这些资产创造出一个市场，因为这种方式能够让资产获得一个特定的价格。然后政府再根据这个价格最后决定是否购买。笔者希望认为最好先用极少部分的资 金来购买这部分资产，如果经济情况持续恶化，在逐渐追加购买的资金。
一些消费者认为，正是那些金融机构的高层使得公司陷入困境，因此他们对动用救市资金帮助这些金融机构度过难关的想法普遍比较反感。尽管人们无法一一列举 那些导致公司陷入困境的众多高层们，但是由于众多企业都因为公司业务策略制订欠妥以及领导们管理不善开了一个很不好的先例。此外，对金融机构高管薪筹的控 制将因外界的救助而成为一纸空文。
市场人士普遍认为，采取该项救市策略会让金融机构误以为如果以后投资再次出现问题，仍会有政府为其买单，该种道德风险对那些接受救助的银行所引发的后果目 前令人担忧。但是笔者发现当整个短期信贷体系濒临崩溃的时候，我们对此的担心应该稍微放松一些。不过，今年三月动用290亿美元的巨额资金购买贝尔斯登公 司不得不说是个错误之举。因为这触发着一个道德风险效应，那些在面临困境的金融机构，包括雷曼兄弟在内的其他投行都会认为如果经济情况再继续恶化，一定会 有政府出面挽救。而政府曾明确地表示，外国的中央银行是那些债券的主要大股东，因此完全没有必要给予他们以及其他股东如此全额的保护。
其中一项有问题的条款就是：政府有权收回所资助的银行的股本。早前一些经济学家提出了让政府扮演类似角色的建议。但笔者认为即便政府不具有对公司股票定价 的投票权，让政府持有私人金融机构的股本这一做法也是很不明智的。在金融历史上的许多例子，诸如目前的意大利航空公司(alitalia）的倒闭都充分说 明，当政府在私有企业拥有股权的时候，政治利益会大大超过经济利益。在此次救市计划中，如果一些银行大量削减某些政府要员所管辖地区的就业人数，或者向海 外转移就业时，就有可能发生类似的倒闭事件。
如果政府巨资救市计划失败，政府所设置的保险条款以及对银行资产的购买举措可能会使得纳税人承受着数千亿美元资产的损失。尽管新闻媒体曾大肆以头条如 “7000亿美元救市计划”等来渲染此种可能性，然而这种情况根本不可能发生，除非经济下滑并且持续维持大萧条局面，而此种事件发生的概率极低。事实上， 通过有效的拍卖，政府能够对救市资金加以很好的利用，如同在上世纪80年代的储贷危机中，政府组建了清债信托公司(Resolution Trust Corporation)处理坏帐，资金没有出现什么损失，并且最终政府能在向私人部门售出资产时获得收益。获得利润并不意味着政府的参与不明智，而是表 明对于纳税人的资金会出现损失只不过是一种夸大的说法而已。
暂时性的限制卖空就是政府对金融市场和其他市场困境进行救助的惯用手段之一，或者称为“枪杀信使”（shoot the messenger）。卖空并不会引发危机，但是会反应出人们对危机将会持续多久的预期理念，政府认为这种预期会掩盖市场上的有用信息，然而为了防止市场 上产生这种理念而出台该项禁令，将会对对冲基金造成不良影响，同时，还会引起其他市场的恐慌。
现今的金融系统基本是大规模地依靠金融衍生产品以及证券化产品，这其中存在一个极大的问题：金融专家在金融系统有可能会引发更大的风险方面欠缺了解，但却 十分清楚个人资产是怎样运作的。这就意味着：在面临多方面的压力时，人们对于极度复杂的金融体系如何运作知之甚少。鉴于这种局限性，很难提出一个长期而有 效的改革方法。不过，以下的这些措施确实能够减轻未来经济发生危机的可能性。
增大资本要求
随着金融危机的不断蔓延，在经济危机结束之后，应该增大与银行资产挂钩的资 本，以防止金融体系中出现资产中高杠杆比率的现象，而这种情况在过去几年内一直存在。必要的时候，美联储可以向投资银行和其他一些货币基金组织征收占其资 产份额极少的资本。并且，在资本衡量上，也应尽可能地将账面价值转为其市场价值，如公开交易的上市银行股票的市场价值。因为采用账面价值的衡量手段往往具 有严重的缺陷，就像上世纪90年代日本发生长达十年的金融危机，而那时的账面价值明显就没有体现出来。
出售两大房贷巨头
政府应该加紧把房利美和房地美转手给无任何政府援助的私人企业。 尽管此次房市出现大混乱并非全由这两家房贷商造成，但它们在近几年里的表现也足以证实其在此次的房市危机中有着不可推卸的责任。它们拥有或担保着12兆亿 美元房贷中近一半的资产，而其企业自身却只有相当薄弱的资本基础。诸如房贷利息免税等一系列政策极大得促进了房市的迅速发展，而其规模也远远超过了政府津 贴所能支撑的水平，与此同时，房市中也出现了本不该由政府赞助的企业。
不要再出现政府救市的情况
随着新的长期金融政策的出台 和实施，应该摈弃掉以往银行和企业过分依赖政府的模式，这样一种模式不仅不适应于完全自由市场的经济体制，而且也在某种程度上造成了过去几年中发生的几次 政府救市的事件，其中一次就是克莱斯勒公司因业绩表现欠佳而申请破产。近些年来，一方面由于受到来自日本、韩国以及德国汽车行业强有力的冲击，另一面则是 由于其企业自身管理缺陷所导致，美国的汽车制造商们纷纷申请并获得政府的资金援助。因此，尽管在此次金融危机中，仍有一小部分情况可以归咎为“由于过多企 业陷入困境，因此才会出现整个市场失调的情形”，但归根到底，还是在于企业自身管理存在缺陷以及缺乏必要的市场竞争机制。
那么，能否认为这次是最后一次“全球资本主义危机”了吗？这里引用了乔治-索罗斯(George Soros)在上世纪末席卷亚洲的金融风暴时所著的一本书名。书中索罗斯认为在每一个进入衰退的领域以及发生金融危机的地方，都存在着扼杀资本主义的危 机，而在早前，也就是19世纪中叶，卡尔-马克思即预言资本主义终将走向灭亡。尽管目前形的严峻性正被大大地低估，不过还可以认为在一个资本家主导的经济 环境下，世界经济早晚会复苏。
这里，我们可以来做一个参考。在上次亚洲金融风暴发生后的十年里，出现了各种关于全球资本主义即将灭亡的说法，然而事实上，全球资本主 义不仅没有灭亡，而且正是因为全球范围内市场竞争力的带动使得世界GDP和贸易量都出现了前所未有的增长。韩国就是一个很典型的例子。在亚洲金融风暴席卷 时，韩国国内经济蒙受巨大损失，而自那以后，经济却大跨步地向前飞跃。因此，我们也有理由相信，只要跨过现在这道坎，世界经济早晚会得到复苏。
加里·贝克尔简介：
加里·贝克尔（Gary S.Becker），美国著名的经济学家和社会学家，1992年诺贝尔经济学奖得主。贝克尔与1991年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主科斯都是芝加哥大学的教授， 但科斯的科研成果主要是论文，而贝克尔则是多产的经济学家和社会学家。在他所有的论著中，《生育率的经济分析》是当代西方人口经济学的创始之作；《人力资 本》是西方人力资本理论的经典，是席卷60年代经济学界的“经济思想上的人力投资革命”的起点；《家庭论》1981年在哈佛大学出版社出版时被该社称为是 贝克尔有关家庭问题的一本划时代的著作，是微观人口经济学的代表作。因而，这三部著作被西方经济学者称为“经典性”论著，具有深远的影响。此外，西方经济 学者把贝克尔的时间经济学和新的消费论称为“贝克尔革命”。In order to promote a much smoother functioning of the financial system, it is paramount to distinguish between the immediate steps needed to cope with the present crisis and the long-run reforms needed to reduce the likelihood of future crises. Let's start with the short-run fixes.
First of all, the magnitude of this financial disturbance should be placed in perspective. Although it is the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it is a far smaller crisis, especially in terms of the effects on output and employment. The United States had about 25% unemployment during most of the decade from 1931 until 1941, and sharp falls in GDP. Other countries experienced economic difficulties of a similar magnitude. So far, American GDP has not yet fallen, and unemployment has reached only a little over 6%. Both figures are likely to get quite a bit worse, but they will nowhere approach those of the 1930s.
The Treasury's announced insurance of all money-market funds, and the full insurance of bank deposits, carry considerable moral hazard risks, but they have not aroused much controversy. The main thrust of the new banking law allows the Treasury secretary to purchase bank assets up to $700 billion in order to increase the liquidity of the banking system. These assets are of uncertain worth since there is essentially no market for many of them, and hence they have no market price. The government hopes to create this market partly through using auctions, where banks would offer their assets at particular prices, and the government would decide whether to buy them. I would have preferred starting with a smaller dollar value of purchases, and up the amount if the situation deteriorates further.
Partly because many consumers are repelled by the intention to bail out companies and their executives who made decisions that got the companies into trouble, the new law includes income and severance pay limits for executives whose firms seek government help. Even though one cannot think much of executives who led their banks into such a mess, that is a bad precedent since it involves too much micromanagement of bank operations. Moreover, such salary controls can be evaded by very generous fringe benefits.
The moral-hazard consequences for banks receiving a bailout now is worrisome since they may expect to get rescued again by the government if their future investments turn sour. Yet while I find helping these banks highly distasteful, moral-hazard concerns should be temporarily relaxed when the whole short-term credit system is close to collapse. Still, the bank bill with its huge bailout does suggest that the $29 billion bailout of the bondholders of Bear Stearns in March was a mistake. It seemed to have a moral-hazard effect by encouraging Lehman Brothers and other investment banks to delay in raising more capital because they too might have expected the government to come to their rescue if times got much worse. Although the government was apparently concerned that foreign central banks were major holders of the bonds, it was unwise to give them and other bondholders such full protection.
One troubling provision is that the government can take an equity stake in banks it helps. Some economists have proposed a similar role for government equity in these banks. I believe it is unwise to give governments equity in private companies, even if the government does not have voting rights in company policies. Many examples in recent history, such as the current Alitalia fiasco, show that political interests outweigh economic ones when governments have some ownership of private companies. This is likely to happen in this bailout if some banks that are helped decide to sharply cut employment in the districts of some congressmen, or to transfer many jobs overseas.
Taxpayers may be stuck with hundreds of billions of dollars of losses from the various government insurance provisions and government purchases of assets. Although the media has made much of this possibility through headlines like "$700 Billion Bailout," such large losses are highly unlikely except in the low probability event that the economy falls into a sustained major depression. Indeed, with efficient auctions, the government may well make money on its actions, just as the Resolution Trust Corporation that took over many savings-and-loan banks during the 1980s crisis did not lose much, if any, money. By buying assets when they are depressed and waiting out the crisis, the government may have a profit on these assets when they are finally sold back to the private sector. Making money does not mean the government involvement is wise, but the likely losses to taxpayers are being greatly exaggerated.
The temporary banning of short sales is an example of a perennial approach to difficulties in financial markets and elsewhere; namely, "shoot the messenger." Short sales did not cause the crisis, but reflect beliefs about how long the slide will continue. Trying to prevent these beliefs from being expressed suppresses useful information, and also creates serious problems for many hedge funds that use short sales to hedge other risks. Their ban can also cause greater panic in other markets.
The main problem with the modern financial system based on widespread use of derivatives and securitization is that while financial specialists understand how individual assets function, even they have limited understanding of the aggregate risks created by the system. That is, insufficient appreciation of how the whole incredibly complex financial system operates when exposed to various types of stress. In light of such limitations, it is difficult to propose long-term reforms. Still, a few reforms seem reasonably likely to reduce the probability of future financial crises.
- Increase capital requirements. The capital requirements of banks relative to assets should be increased after the crisis is over in order to prevent the highly leveraged ratios of assets to capital in financial institutions during the past several years. Possibly a minimum ratio of capital to assets should be imposed by the Fed on investment banks and money funds. As much as possible, the measure of capital should not be its book value but its market value, such as the market value of publicly traded shares of banks. Book value measures, for example, apparently badly missed the plight of Japanese banks during their decade-long banking crisis of the 1990s.
- Sell Freddie and Fannie. The government should as quickly as possible sell Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to fully private companies that receive no government insurance or other help. These two giants did not cause the housing mess, but in recent years they surely greatly contributed to it, partly through congressional pressure on them to increase their purchases of subprime loans. They have owned or guaranteed almost half of the $12 trillion in outstanding mortgages while having a small capital base. The housing market already has excessive amounts of government subsidies, such as from the tax exemption of interest on mortgages, and should not have government sponsored enterprises that insure mortgage-backed securities.
- No more bailouts. The "too big to fail" approach to banks and other companies should be abandoned as new long-term financial policies are developed. Such an approach is inconsistent with a free-market economy. It also has caused dubious company bailouts in the past, such as the large government loan years ago to Chrysler, a company that remained weak and should have been allowed to go into bankruptcy. All the American auto companies have asked for and received handouts too since they cannot compete against Japanese, Korean and German car makers, partly because these American companies have been incredibly badly managed. A "too many institutions in trouble to fail principle," as in the present financial crisis, may still be necessary on rare occasions, but failure of badly run large financial and other companies is healthy and indeed necessary for the survival of a robust free-enterprise competitive system.
Is this a final "Crisis of Global Capitalism" -- to borrow the title of a book by George Soros written shortly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98? The crisis that kills capitalism has been said to happen during every major recession and financial crisis ever since Karl Marx prophesized the collapse of capitalism in the middle of the 19th century. Although I admit to having greatly underestimated the severity of the current crisis, I am confident that sizable world economic growth will resume before very long under a mainly capitalist world economy.
Consider, for example, that in the decade after various predictions of the collapse of global capitalism following the Asian crisis, both world GDP and world trade experienced unprecedented growth thanks to the power of market competition on a global scale. The South Korean economy, for example, was pummeled during that crisis, but has had significant economic growth since. World economic growth will recover once we are over the present severe financial difficulties.
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